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Abstract
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks are vulnerable to a variety of network layer attacks
such as black hole, grey hole, sleep deprivation & rushing attacks. In this
paper we present an intrusion detection & adaptive response mechanism for
MANETs that detects a range of attacks and provides an effective response
with low network degradation. We consider the deficiencies of a fixed response
to an intrusion; and we overcome these deficiencies with a flexible response
scheme that depends on the measured confidence in the attack, the severity of
attack and the degradation in network performance. We present results from
an implementation of the response scheme that has three intrusion response
actions. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed detection
and adaptive response mechanisms in various attack scenarios. An analysis of
the impact of our proposed scheme shows that it allows a flexible approach to
management of threats and demonstrates improved network performance with
a low network overhead.
1. Introduction
Intrusion detection and prevention provides a way to protect mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) from attacks by external or internal intruders. There are
two principal intrusion detection techniques: anomaly based intrusion detection
(ABID) and knowledge based intrusion detection (KBID); additionally, speci-
fication based intrusion detection techniques (SBID) have also been proposed
recently. Once an intrusion has been detected by an intrusion detection system
(IDS) it is desirable to take action to thwart attacks or mitigate the damage
caused by the attack: this action is referred to as an intrusion response (IR).
Although intrusion response is normally a part of the intrusion detection sys-
tem, it has historically received less attention than the detection component of
the IDS.
General protection approaches such as [10][11][14][15][17] do not consider
attack responses at all, and some other proposed MANET IDSs, for example
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[1][16][9], respond to intrusion in a predetermined fixed way by isolating or ban-
ning the detected intruder nodes. However, in some cases authors have focused
on the intrusion response and presented new ways of responding to intrusion.
For example, an agent-based cooperative response was proposed in [3]. A cost
sensitive model for Intrusion Response Systems (IRS) in fixed networks was
proposed in [12]. The authors of [13] used this concept to provide a cost sen-
sitive intrusion response for MANETs. In MANETs it is difficult to calculate
the intrusion response cost, which we can define as the negative impact on the
network resources caused by the response. In [13] the authors first estimate a
Topology Dependency Index (TDI) which indicates how much the routing ser-
vice of nodes in the network will be disrupted if the intruder is isolated. Then
they estimate the Attack Damage Index (ADI) that indicates the damage caused
by an attack. The ADI calculates the damage in terms of the number of nodes
that are affected by the attack. Finally, they respond to the intrusion by isolat-
ing the attacker if the ADI is greater than the TDI. This cost-sensitive model
was proposed for the proactive routing protocol OLSR where complete network
topology information is available for every node. However, this approach is not
suitable for reactive routing protocols such as AODV & DSR because they only
provide partial topology information; for example, in AODV a node only knows
its next hops towards the source or destination of active paths.
In this paper, we present an intrusion detection & adaptive response mecha-
nism (IDAR) that employs a combination of both anomaly based and knowledge
based intrusion detection techniques, and takes advantage of both techniques
to protect MANETs against a variety of attacks. We consider our previously
proposed algorithm [1] that responds to intrusion in all cases by isolating the
intruding nodes in a predetermined fixed way. We investigate the impact on
a MANET’s performance of (a) various attacks and (b) the fixed intrusion re-
sponse (isolation) of our previous algorithm [1]. The results of this investigation
enable us to identify the deficiencies of the fixed response approach. To overcome
these deficiencies, in this paper we now propose an adaptive flexible intrusion
response scheme. This new scheme selects the intrusion response action based
on the severity of the attack, the degradation in network performance and the
expected impact of the response action on the network performance. Further,
to improve scalability and to estimate the overhead imposed by our scheme we
borrow and implement the clustering approach proposed in [2], modifying it for
our protection mechanism. Finally, we have conducted a case study to assess the
overall effectiveness of the proposed detection and adaptive response scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the archi-
tecture and core functionality of the training, intrusion detection, attack iden-
tification and intruder identification phases of IDAR. In Section 3 we present
in detail the flexible adaptive intrusion response scheme. Section 4 presents the
assessment of IDAR and evaluation of the effectiveness of the scheme through a
case study, including extensive simulations. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
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2. Proposed Protection Mechanism
In this Section, we describe the architecture and core functions of IDAR.
For completeness and clarity we first briefly review the data collection, train-
ing, intrusion detection, attack identification and intrusion identification phases
in this section (the algorithm and technical details of these phases were origi-
nally described in [1]). We then present in detail the adaptive flexible intrusion
response scheme in Section 3.
2.1. Key Assumptions
Although both physical and data link layer operations are vulnerable to at-
tacks we do not explicitly consider attacks in these layers in this paper. However,
we believe that with appropriate matrix selection, IDAR can also be applied ef-
fectively for these layers.
We note that ABID requires audit data traces and traffic patterns of normal
events to build a training profile that is then used to detect anomalies in the
network. However, in contrast with fixed networks, data resources such as [18]
that reflect normal activities or events are not currently available for MANETs.
Therefore, we assume that the initial behaviour of the network is free from
anomalies.
To improve the scalability of IDAR we use a clustered MANET organiza-
tion, in which all network nodes operate in one of the three roles of manager
node (MN), cluster heads (CH) and cluster nodes (CNs). We further assume a
security mechanism [4] to protect communication between MN, CHs and CNs.
The details of these mechanisms are outside the scope of the work in this paper,
because we focus on the intrusion detection & response mechanism.
2.2. Architecture & Core Functionality
In this subsection, we describe the architecture and core functionality of
IDAR. Fig.1 (a) illustrates the simplified architecture. It shows that IDAR
operates in three main stages: network monitoring & data collection, training,
and testing, and we now describe these stages.
2.2.1. Network Monitoring and Data Collection
IDAR monitors the network and periodically collects data for intrusion de-
tection and prevention throughout the network’s lifetime. In the data collection
phase, after each time interval (TI) the CHs gather data from the CNs within
their virtual cluster. The data is stored in the form of two matrices: the net-
work characteristic matrix (NCM) and a performance matrix (PM). The CHs
then report these matrices to the MN. The NCM records data that is specific
to the network routing protocol. However, IDAR is general, and different NCM
parameters can be used for different routing protocols. In this paper we illus-
trate IDAR using AODV as the routing protocol, and the NCM consists of the
following seven parameters:
NCM= { RREP (route reply), RREQ (route request), RERR (route error),
TTL (time to live) values, RREQ src_seq„ RREP dest_seq RREQ dest_seq }
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Figure 1: Intrusion detection & response mechanism architecture: (a) simplified, left; (b)
detailed, right.
The performance matrix consists of parameters which reflect the network
performance and which can be derived from NCM parameters. Here, the PM
consists of the following four parameters:
PM= {RPO (routing protocol overhead), PDR (data packet delivery ratio),
CPD (number of control packets dropped), Throughput}
NCM is a two dimensional matrix of (r * c) and the number of rows (r) and
number of columns (c) depend on its parameters; therefore its storage structure
is dynamically assigned by the IDAR monitor. In the PM, the routing packet
overhead (RPO) is the ratio of the number of routing packets sent as a fraction of
the number of data packets delivered to their destination nodes in the network.
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) is the ratio of the number of data packets
received at the destination nodes to the number of data packets originated by
source nodes. The number of control packets dropped (CPD) is the number of
routing packets dropped during the routing process, including route discoveries
and route maintenance procedures in the network. The last parameter of the
performance matrix, throughput, represents the average network throughput.
2.2.2. Training
In the training phase, CHs continuously gather NCM and PM informa-
tion, and at fixed time intervals report their collected data to the MN. The
MN applies the training module for N for these time intervals. The NCM
consists of j parameters, where j=1 to 7 in the case study in this paper.
jX
i
k = X1, X2, X3, . . . , XM is a set of random variables representing the j th
NCM parameter in the ith time interval and k= (1 to M ) represents the num-
ber of random variables in the j th NCM parameter, where M is the maximum
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value of the random variables of the NCM’s j th parameter in the ith time in-
terval. Similarly, the performance matrix is represented by jY ik where j=1 to
4 in this paper’s case study. The MN calculates the probability distribution of
P(jXik ) for time interval i, and also calculates the PM parameters for the ith
time interval. This whole process is repeated for the N time intervals. The MN
then calculates the mean NCM of P(jXik ) and the mean PM for N intervals,
and these are stored as an initial training profile (ITP) of the NCM and PM.
These initial training profiles reflect the normal behaviour of the nodes in the
network and the expected network performance.
2.2.3. Testing
Testing operates in four phases: a) intrusion detection; b) attack identifi-
cation; c) intruder identification; and d) adaptive intrusion response, as shown
in Fig.1(b). The first three phases are described in this sub section, while the
adaptive intrusion response scheme is presented in detail in section 3.
Intrusion Detection. In the intrusion detection phase the MN considers the
network characteristic parameters from the NCM, and uses ABID to identify
any intrusion in the network. The ABID uses the chi-square test, because it
has a low computational cost and is based on distance measure, as compared to
other tests such as Hotelling’s T2. The algorithm first calculates the probability
distribution of each NCM parameter, and stores these as observed values. For
each time interval (TI) the MN performs hypothesis testing with null hypothesis
Ho[j](observed distribution of NCM fits the expected) for each parameter j of
the NCM at calculated chi-computed values obtained from Equation 1, where
j is the NCM parameter and k(=1 to M ) is the number of random variables
in each parameter. The MN then performs combined hypothesis testing of all
parameters of the NCM.
χ2[j] = ∀j(
M∑
k=1
(
(jX
i
k− ¯jXik)2
¯
jXik
)).....(1)
If the combined null hypothesis Ho (observed distribution of all NCM pa-
rameters fits the expected) is rejected then it assumes intrusion has occured
during the TI, and proceeds to the next stage i.e. attack identification. Else, we
update the initial training profile of the NCM through an exponentially weighted
moving average (EWMA):
∀j(jXi(q,kM1 ) = β ? jX
i
(q,kM1 )
+ (1− β) ? jXi(q,kM1 ))......(2) , where jX
i
(q,kM1 )
and
jX
i
(q,kM1 )
represent the expected and observed values of NCM parameter j for
update period number q respectively. The value of q is incremented in the TI
when no intrusion in the MANET is detected. k represents the random
variable from 1 to M in each NCM parameter and β = 2(q−1) is the weighting
factor. The updated expected profile model therefore reflects the current
behaviour of the network.
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Figure 2: Knowledge Base of IDAR
Attack Identification. If network intrusion is detected, the MN proceeds to the
second stage, namely attack identification. This uses a rule-based approach to
identify the attack that is taking place. IDAR maintains a knowledge base (KB)
that is used in all stages of the testing phase. The knowledge base consists of
facts, rules and an inference engine as shown in Fig.2. We have constructed
a set of rules for attack and intruder identification by analyzing the existing
literature of known attacks, for example [5][6][7][8], and through investigating
various attacks including their impact on network performance. The KB infer-
ence engine employs forward chaining on the set of rules and looks for the goal
condition fulfillment that indicates a known attack.
Intruder Identification . Once an attack has been identified, the MN initiates
intruder identification. In this phase, the MN applies intruder identification
rules that are specific to the the known attack. For example in case of a black
hole attack it analyzes the RREP messages received from all the nodes during
the latest TI and finds the node that has initiated the false RREP packet with
the highest destination sequence number.
Following intruder identification, an IDS should ideally respond to the intru-
sion. In our original work [1] we employed a fixed intrusion response, in which
the intruding node was in all cases isolated. However, as we shall see, this has
deficiencies and therefore, to improve the overall effectiveness of the protection
mechanism we have introduced an adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme,
described in the next section.
3. Adaptive Intrusion Response Scheme
We now present the new adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme. We first
describe the response model’s internal architecture. We then illustrate a set of
possible intrusion response actions suitable for MANETs, three of which are used
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Figure 3: Adaptive intrusion response scheme
in the case study described in Section 4. We also present the technical details
of the adaptive intrusion response scheme. Finally, we give a time complexity
analysis of this proposed scheme.
3.1. Adaptive Intrusion Response Scheme Architecture
Fig. 3 shows the architecture of the adaptive intrusion response scheme. Fol-
lowing a successful intruder detection, attack identification, and intruder iden-
tification, the intrusion response is implemented by the manager node, which
primarily performs three tasks as shown in Fig. 3. In the first task the MN
calculates the confidence level of the attack that has been detected, using the de-
tection information. The MN then evaluates the network performance degrada-
tion (NPD) since the attack was launched using information in the performance
matrix; this gives a measure of the severity of the attack. Finally a response
action is selected and the necessary actions required to implement the intrusion
response action (IRA) are taken. The selection of the response action requires
the network administrator to model in advance the response decision process in
the form of a decision table. This defines the criteria for selection of the IRA,
taking into account the appropriateness of the IRA in the current context by
considering the level of confidence in the detected intrusion and the degree of
NPD.
3.2. Intrusion Response Action
Most of the IDSs in the literature respond to an intrusion in a predetermined
fixed manner without considering the negative impact of the response or the side
effects of the IRA on the network. To enhance the effectiveness of the intrusion
response and to reduce its adverse effects on the network, we first consider
possible IRAs (i.e. a range of punishments suitable for the intruding node) that
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are appropriate for MANETs. Then after analyzing the appropriateness of each
IRA, we select a set of IRAs for the IDAR case study presented in Section 4.
3.2.1. List of Intrusion Response Actions
An example list of possible IRAs based on the various operations each net-
work node performs on data and routing packets is as follows:
Isolation. In this response action all nodes in the network punish the intruding
node by completely isolating it from the network immediately, that is, sim-
ply treat the intruder as non-existent. To employ this IRA, nodes impose the
following restriction in terms of data forwarding and routing service.
• Network nodes do not forward any data packets originating from or des-
tined to the intruding node.
• Network nodes do not route any data packets through the intruder.
• Network nodes do not send any routing packets to or through the intruder.
• Network nodes ignore all routing packets originating from the intruding
node.
Probabilistic Isolation. In this IRA, nodes do not isolate the intruder com-
pletely; instead they apply some restriction in terms of forwarding its data.
Specifically, nodes perform the following actions:
• Network nodes only forward some of the intruding node’s data packets,
with a specified probability.
• Network nodes do not send any routing packets through the intruder.
This ensures the intruder is not able to initiate further routing attacks, but is
still able to forward data packets for other nodes in the network.
Route Around Attacker. In this IRA, nodes route data packets around the in-
truding node to stop further attacks from the intruding node while still allowing
the intruder to forward data packets for other nodes. To employ this intrusion
response nodes perform the following actions:
• Allow the intruder to forward data packets for other nodes in the network
for existing routes. Nodes process these data packets so that they will
reach their destinations.
• Do not include the intruder in new route discoveries, i.e. route the packets
around the intruding node.
• Ignore all routing packets generated and forwarded by intruder (i.e. to
prevent further attacks).
Thus, although packets will initially continue to be routed through the intruder,
eventually the routes will expire as the network topology changes and eventually
the intruder will not be included in any paths in the network.
8
Service Denial. In this response, network nodes deny services provided to or
offered by the intruder while using the intruder as an intermediate router. For
this intrusion response nodes perform the following tasks:
• Network nodes do not forward any data packets originating from or des-
tined to the intruding node.
• Network nodes ignore any further services the intruder provides to other
nodes in the network, for example providing internet access.
• Allow data packets to be routed through intruder nodes i.e. still use the
intruder as an intermediate router in the network.
No Punishment. In some cases when the attack is not severe, i.e. the per-
formance of the network is not significantly affected, it is possible that imple-
menting any intrusion response will cause a worse degradation of the network
performance than simply ignoring the attack. In these cases, the attack is simply
ignored.
Relocation. Another response action is to physically move a node so that it is
closer to the intruder node before isolating the intruder. This approach requires
the availability of network topology information to find critical nodes in the
network, and also requires the network to be able to command its nodes to move
as required. For example, if isolating the intruder causes network partitioning
due to its location in the network then a different node can be relocated close
to the intruder node first to maintain the network connectivity, and then the
intruder can be isolated from the network.
3.2.2. Proposed Intrusion Response Actions
We consider the appropriateness of each response action in the above list of
possible IRAs in terms of their side effects or any adverse impact they might have
on network performance. In addition, we further analyze the appropriateness
of these response actions in terms of their practical effectiveness in combating
attack, mitigating damage cause by attack and stopping further attacks from
the intruding node. We then propose three IRAs for our response scheme and
case study based on confidence on detected attacks and the impact of the attacks
on network performance. This selected set of IRAs is as follows:
Isolation. This response action is used when the confidence in a detected at-
tack is high, and the attack is severe, and the network performance has degraded
considerably since the attack was launched. By isolating the intruder, nodes in
the network will treat the intruder as non-existent. Although this will cause
a rerouting overhead it still improves the overall network performance signifi-
cantly.
Route Around Attacker. When the confidence in the detected attack is rea-
sonably high and the NPD is noticeable then the response scheme will employ
Route Around Attacker. This stops further attacks from the intruder while still
maintaining the data forwarding service in the network.
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No Punishment. When the COA is not high or the attack is not severe and
NPD is tolerable then our response scheme will simply ignore the attack. This
avoids reasonable adverse effects on the network performance.
3.3. Technical Details
We now consider in detail the functional of each process involved in the adap-
tive flexible intrusion response scheme. We observe that given the probabilistic
nature of intrusion detection an intrusion response based on a single detection
of an intruding node is not sufficient. Consequently, to optimise the probability
of identifying intruders correctly (i.e. with a low level of false positives), the
MN maintains a test sliding window (TSW). IDAR will therefore respond to the
intrusion only when the intruding node has been identified in a number of time
intervals (TIs). Specifically, an intrusion response only occurs if a given intruder
node is identified in at least d detections out of p TIs of the TSW. To select the
appropriate values of p (representing the size of the TSW in units of TIs, i.e.
the number of checks considered) and d (the minimum number of detections
required to confirm a detected node as an attacker), we note that the detection
of an intruding node within a TSW is a Bernoulli trial (i.e. the trials during
the TSW are identical and independent repetitions of the experiment with two
possible outcomes: detection or no detection). The probability of confirmation
of intrusion in a sequence of Bernoulli trials is therefore given by
Pc =
p∑
i=d
Cpi ? (P )
i ? (1− p)(p−i)......(3)
In Equation 3, P represents a probability of a single detection, Pc is the
probability of at least d detections in a TSW of size p, thereby confirming a
node as an intruder, and Cpi =
p!
i!(p−1)! is the binomial coefficient. The curves in
Fig. 4 show how the probability of a node being confirmed as an intruder varies
as a function of the number of detections required, d, with different values of
probability of a single detection, P, for a TSW of size p=5. The graph shows
that the probability of identifying a node as an intruder is over 90% when
P=80% and d=1, 2 or 3. However, it is also important to avoid false positives:
for example, if P=20% represents the probability of wrongly identifying a node
that is in fact correctly behaving, then the probability of a false positive is
below 10% when d=3, 4 or 5. In this example, d=3 provides a balance between
correctly identifying an intruding node and avoiding a false positive.
The MN runs the adaptive intrusion response scheme for all nodes that have
been identified as intruders in the current test sliding window, using Algorithm
1. The MN first estimates the confidence on attack detected (COA) value, based
on the detection and accusation information:
COA = w1 ? CI + w2 ? Pc....(4)
In Equation 4, Wi represents a weighting factor, where the sum of these
weights equals one. CI represents the confidence interval of the chi-square test
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Figure 4: Probability of confirmation (Pc) as a function of d (least number of detections
required) with varying probability of single detection P (p=5).
during the intrusion detection phase and Pc is the probability of confirmation.
Equation 3 returns a confidence value for Pc between 0 and 1.
The MN then evaluates the NPD value using equation 5. This is a weighted
sum of the changes in the performance matrix parameter values (i.e. throughput,
packet delivery ratio, routing protocol overhead and routing packets dropped)
from when there was no attack in the network to their current values, as follows:
NPD = w1 ?4Throughput+w2 ?4PDR+w3 ?4RPO+w4 ?4RPD.......(5)
where Δ represents the percentage change in the parameter between the
average value in the current test sliding window and the average value of the
parameter when there was no attack in the network. Once the COA and NPD
values have been calculated, the MN assigns confidence levels to the COA and
NPD. For illustration in this paper we define four COA levels, as shown in
Table 1, namely low, medium, high or very high. For the NPD we again use
four levels, but the precise mapping of NPD value to NPD level varies as will
be seen in Section 4. These levels are then used in the decision table, Figure 5,
(from the knowledge base constructed by the network administrator) to select
the intrusion response. Modelling the intrusion response selection through a
decision table allows the network administrator to configure and modify the
intrusion response selection process for different network environments.
Fig. 5 shows the decision table used in our case study. The first two rows
represent the conditions (i.e. COA and NPD levels) and the last three rows
represent the actions (i.e. isolation, route around attacker and no punishment).
If the selected intrusion response is isolation or route around attacker then the
MN informs all nodes of the IRA by broadcasting an accusation packet (AP).
In the case of no punishment the MN ignores the attack. When a CN receives
an AP it first checks the broadcast id and source address of the packet to avoid
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Table 1: Mapping ranges of COA values to COA levels
COA Level Range of COA values (%)
Low 0 < COA value (%) ≤ 25
Medium 25 < COA value (%) ≤ 50
High 50 < COA value (%) ≤ 70
Very High COA value (%) > 70
Algorithm 1 Intrusion Response Mechanism
For all detected and identified nodes Vi in a Test Sliding Window
• Calculate Confidence On Attack (COA) value using Equation 4.
• Calculate Network Performance Degradation (NPD) value using Equation
5.
• Assign COA level based on calculated COA value (Table 1).
• Assign NPD level based on calculated NPD value.
• Search Decision Table (Figure 5) using COA & NPD levels and identify
Intrusion Response Action (IRA)
• If (IRA== ISOLATION)
MN blacklists Vi & broadcasts Accusation Packet (AP)
with IRA=ISOLATION
Else If (IRA== ROUTE_AROUND_ATTACKER)
MN temporarily blacklists Vi & broadcasts AP
with IRA=ROUTE_AROUND
Else: MN sets IRA to no punishment
EndIf
EndIf
EndFor
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Algorithm 2 Accusation Packet Handling
• Each CN Vi maintains its local BlacklistTable (BLT) & Temporary Black-
list (TBLT).
• If CN Vi receives an AP for CN Vj.
• If CN Vi has node Vj in its BLT or TBLT then Ignore AP
Else: CN Vi checks IRA in AP.
If (IRA== ISOLATION)
CN adds node Vj to its BLT & rebroadcasts AP.
CN isolates intruding node Vj (Algorithm 3(a))
Else CN adds node Vj to its TBLT & rebroadcasts AP.
CN routes around intruder Vj (Algorithm 3(b))
EndIf
EndIf
EndIf
processing duplicate APs. If the accused node Vj is already blacklisted either
permanently or temporarily then the CN will ignore and drop the AP to prevent
unnecessary network traffic (Algorithm 2). Otherwise, the CN will check the
IRA specified in the AP for the node Vj. In the case of isolation, the CN
will first add intruder Vj to its blacklist table, and then to isolate the intruder
from the network all nodes will drop all packets from blacklisted node and also
immediately ignore all packets in the queue that are from the blacklisted nodes
as shown in (Algorithm 3(a)). If the IRA is route around attacker then the CN
will first add the intruder Vj to its temporary blacklist table. To implement
this IRA, all nodes will ignore and drop routing packets i.e. RREQ, RREP,
& RERR packets generated or forwarded by the intruder node Vj to prevent
further attacks from the intruder. All nodes exclude intruder Vj in their new
route discoveries, i.e. they select routes that do not include Vj in the path.
However, nodes will still forward the data packets received from Vj for existing
routes to maintain the current level of data forwarding service (Algorithm 3(b)).
Allowing a data-forwarding service from Vj reduces the possibility of adverse
affects on network performance for a period, until the nodes find new routes
around Vj. This response action is also effective when node Vj is a critical node
in terms of its location in the network topology, when isolating node Vj could
have significant side effects on network performance.
3.4. Time Complexity Analysis of Adaptive Intrusion Response Scheme
We now consider the complexity of the adaptive intrusion response mecha-
nism. We assume that a single non-iterative task takes t seconds to complete.
The intrusion response module is called for each node j that has been detected
as an intruder in a TSW and we further assume that the proposed mechanism
consists of n TSWs. The intrusion response phase can be further divided into
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Algorithm 3 Intrusion Response Action
a) Isolate Intruding Node
• If node Vi receives packet from node Vj
• If node Vj is in node Vi BLT ignore all packets & drop all packets
queued from Vj
• Else: handle & process packet
• EndIf
• EndIf
b) Route Around Attacker
• If node Vj is in node Vi TBLT
• If node Vi receives routing packet from node Vj
• Ignore & drop RREQ, RREP & RERR packets from Vj
• EndIf
• If node Vi receives data packet from node Vj destined for node Vk.
• Node Vi forwards data packets towards node Vk
• EndIf
• Node Vj removes route entries including node Vj from its route table
• Else:
• Handle & process packet
• EndIf
• EndIf
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four tasks:
1. Calculating the COA for each node j (Eq. 4). This involves calculating
CI and Pc, and so takes time 2 * j * t seconds.
2. The intrusion response module then evaluates the NPD for each detected
nodej (Eq. 5), which is based on M performance matrix parameters. This
takes time j * M * t seconds.
3. The MN searches its decision table (i.e. a decision tree) with the calcu-
lated COA & NPD values, to identify the intrusion response action. The
complexity of building a decision tree is 2d-1, where d is the depth of the
decision tree. We assume as a worst case that the complexity of searching
a decision tree is the same as building it, so the time it takes to build
and search the decision tree for the intrusion response will be (2d -1) * 2t
seconds.
4. The MN compares the intrusion response selected from the decision table
and performs this intrusion response action. The comparison will take t
sec. Let us assume the selected response is isolation, and that this includes
blacklisting node j and broadcasting an AP; this will take 2 * j * t seconds.
Now combining tasks 1), 2) , 3) and 4) gives a running time complexity
= n{ 2 * j *t +j * M * t + (2d -1) * 2 * t + t + 2* j * t}, which can be
simplified to n{j(4+M)+4d-1}t. Now if we focus on the non-constant portion
of the running time and ignore the constant then the above expression in big
O notation will be O(nj(M+d)). This expression suggests that the running
time complexity of the intrusion response module depends on n (number of test
sliding windows over which the module is applied), j (the number of nodes for
which the intrusion response is required), M (the number of performance matrix
parameters) and d (the depth of the decision tree used by the IR module).
4. Case Study and Evaluation
We have described the principles of IDAR in Sections 2 and 3, and we now
present a case study that illustrates and assesses the proposed adaptive protec-
tion mechanism. We first evaluate the performance of the protection mechanism
in different attack scenarios. In the second part of the case study, we investigate
the IRA selected by IDAR under various attack scenarios and assess the scalabil-
ity of the proposed mechanism. In the third part of the case study we consider
the impact of IDAR on the network performance. We do this by evaluating
three response approaches, namely a) the effectiveness of the mechanism with
no intrusion response, b) the effectiveness of the mechanism with fixed intrusion
response, and c) the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism with adaptive flex-
ible response. We analyze the impact of the three response approaches on the
routing protocol overhead (when using AODV) and the direct IDAR overhead.
Finally in this Section, we compare IDAR with two other mechanisms described
in the literature.
Our assessment of IDAR under various attack scenarios is based on simu-
lations. We use GloMoSim version 2.03 to build the simulation environment,
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Figure 5: Decision Table for an adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme
Table 2: Simulation Parameters
Number of Nodes 25 50 100 150 200
Terrain Dimensions
(metres)
500*500 707 *707 1000*1000 1225*1225 1415*1415
Node placement Distributed uniformly
Routing protocol AODV
Simulation time 2000 seconds
Simulation traffic Constant Bit Rate
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Nodes’ mean speed Varies from 0 to 20 m/s
using the parameters shown in Table 2. IDAR is assessed using the configuration
parameters shown in Table 3. More generally, these parameters can be changed
to enable the mechanism to cope with different protection requirements. For
example in order to adapt to a network where intrusion detection and response
time is critical, the network administrator can adjust configuration parameters
such as time interval and test sliding window size.
4.1. Evaluation of Proposed Mechanism: Attack Identification
In this sub-section, we assess IDAR in terms of its success rate (SR) and false
alarm rate (FA) in different attack scenarios. By SR, we mean the percentage
of intrusions that are correctly detected, and where both the attack type and
the intruder node are correctly identified. FA means a properly behaving node
that has been incorrectly identified as an intruder.
We first test IDAR’s performance with a number of attack types. At each
tested mean speed and for each network size (25, 50 or 100 nodes) we perform
40 runs with no intrusion and 40 runs with intruders. The graph in Fig. 6
depicts the SR and FA rate of IDAR as a function of the nodes’ mean speed in
25, 50 & 100 node networks with a sleep deprivation (SD) attack by malicious
RREQ flooding (i.e. a Denial of Service (DoS) attack). The figure shows good
performance of IDAR in terms of high success rate and low FA rates against the
SD attack. The graph in Fig. 7 illustrates the performance of IDAR wagainst
black and grey hole attacks, and again shows good performance in terms of high
success and low false alarm rate.
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Figure 6: Success & false alarm rate of SD attack
Figure 7: Success & false alarm rate of Black & Grey hole attack
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Figure 8: Success & false alarm rate of Rushing attack
Finally the graph in Fig. 8 shows the performance of IDAR under a rushing
attack through forged RREQ packets, and again illustrates IDAR’s good per-
formance. In all three attacks considered, the performance drops slightly when
the nodes are moving with high speed because with high mobility causes an
increased frequency of link failure, and route discovery takes a longer time.
4.2. Evaluation of Intrusion Response Action
We now consider how the intrusion response selected by IDAR varies in
different attack scenarios and analyze the appropriateness of the IRA. We assess
IDAR’s scalability by including experiments with 100, 150 & 200 node networks.
4.2.1. Black Hole Attack
In this scenario, we test IDAR when one randomly selected intruding node
launches a BH attack. We perform 20 runs for each network size (25, 50, 100,
150 & 200 nodes), and use the simulation parameters, configuration parameters
and COA mapping range shown in Tables 2, 3 and 1 respectively. The adaptive
response scheme uses the decision table shown in Fig. 5 to determine the IRA
selection.
The graph in Fig. 9 shows (expressed as a percentage) the fraction of total
identified intrusions for which each IRA (i.e. isolating intruder, route around
attacker or no punishment) was selected. The intrusion response scheme used
the NPD level settings shown in the graph. The graph shows that for the BH
attacks IDAR isolated the intruding node in most cases. It can be seen that in
larger networks (i.e. more than 100 nodes in the network) IDAR responded to
an intrusion by routing around the intruder node in (on average) 26% of cases
and opted to ignore the attack on average 23% of the time. IDAR isolated the
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Table 3: Configuration Parameters
Time interval (TI) 100 seconds
Training period (N ) 5 TIs
Testing period 15 TIs
Number of intruders Varying from 1 to 5
Chi-square test (α) 5% (i.e. 95% confidence interval)
Test Sliding Window (TSW) 5 TIs
Number of Parameters PM=4 & NCM=7 parameters
Intrusion Response Actions Complete Isolation, Route Around
Attacker & No Punishment
Confidence on attack Function of: Confidence Interval of
Network Performance Degradation Function of: Network Throughput,
PDR, RPO & RPD
COA & NPD levels 4 (Low, Medium, High & Very High)
intruder 90% of times on average in smaller networks (25 & 50 nodes) but this
percentage drops to 53% in the larger networks.
To investigate the difference in intrusion response selection in the smaller
and larger networks, we repeated the same set of experiments by first adjusting
the NPD level settings and then slightly modifying the way an intruder launches
a BH attack in a larger network. To launch a BH attack, an intruder first sends
a forged RREP with an incremented destination sequence number (indicating
freshness of route). This increment is f. We used f in the range 5 ≤ f ≤ 30
for the smaller network sizes (25 & 50 nodes), and 15 ≤ f ≤ 40 in the larger
networks (100, 150 & 200 nodes), because a larger value of f allows an intruder
to capture more routes by falsely claiming to nodes that it has fresher routes.
The graph of Fig. 10 shows the results with the modified NPD level settings
shown on the graph. The figure shows that the selected IRA does not vary
much between smaller and larger networks: IDAR responds to the BH attack
by isolating the intruder most of the time in larger networks as well as the
smaller ones. We infer from Figs. 9 and 10 that an intruder has to adjust the
way it launches the BH attack in MANETs to cause the same amount of damage
in larger networks as in smaller networks, and that consequently the protection
mechanism has to adopt in order to improve its performance in larger networks
(scalability).
4.2.2. Sleep Deprivation Attack
In this scenario, we test our intrusion response scheme with a SD attack.
Following the approach used in the black hole attack, we use the modified NPD
level settings. The graph of Fig.11 shows that IDAR has responded to a SD
attack by isolating the intruding node 78% of the time on average across all
network sizes. In general it shows the appropriateness of the action taken by
IDAR intrusion response scheme, because we know from the literature, and from
our previous work [1], and by analyzing the impact of various attacks that SD is
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Figure 9: Intrusion response action selected in BH attack
a severe DoS attack that generally causes considerable damage to the network.
It can also be seen from the graph that the proposed intrusion response scheme
scales well for larger networks.
4.2.3. Rushing Attack
Our final evaluation of the intrusion response action considers a rushing
attack. We believe rushing is a mild attack, and this is confirmed by tests where
we have inspected the impact of various attacks on MANETs’ performance. The
graph of Fig.12 shows that in response to a rushing attack IDAR’s response
scheme has elected not to punish the intruding nodes most of the time, and
this result is approximately independent of network size. This is because the
impact of a rushing attack on network performance is generally low, and we have
observed that taking strict action such as isolation when the attack is minor can
actually result in a net degradation of network performance. The main reason
for this degradation is that isolating a node that might perform an important
routing function can affect a number of routes in the network, with rerouting
causing disruption and degradation in network performance. This result shows
the flexibility and effectiveness of our protection mechanism. However, it can be
seen from the graph that in some cases the rushing attack significantly degrades
the network performance, and in these cases IDAR has responded by either
isolating or routing around the intruder node.
4.3. Impact of the Adaptive Flexible Intrusion Response Scheme
We now consider the impact of the intrusion response scheme on network
performance. We initially estimate the effectiveness of the intrusion response
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Figure 10: IRA selected in BH attack with modified NPD level settings
Figure 11: Intrusion response action selected in SD attack
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Figure 12: Intrusion response action selected in Rushing attack
scheme in terms of degradation in network performance when either a) no intru-
sion response, b) a fixed intrusion response, or c) an adaptive flexible intrusion
response scheme is employed in the various attacks. We then analyze the impact
of the IDAR response action on the AODV and IDAR overhead .
4.3.1. Impact of Intrusion Response Action on Network Performance
In this scenario, we analyze the effectiveness of the intrusion response scheme
using NPD as a metric. We consider 25 and 50 node networks, both with
various attacks and also with combinations of different simultaneous attacks.
We performed 30 runs with each attack in a 25 node network, these being 10
runs when IDAR does not respond to intrusion, 10 runs when IDAR responds
with a fixed response (isolate intruder) in all cases, and 10 runs when IDAR
employs the adaptive flexible intrusion response scheme. We also repeated these
tests with a 50 node network.
The graphs of Fig. 13 and 14 shows the effectiveness of the intrusion re-
sponse scheme in terms of the NPD, for 25 and 50 node networks respectively.
They show the NPD in various attack situations when there is no response to
intrusion by IDAR, when the response is intruder isolation, and in the adaptive
response case. It can be seen from the graphs that the average network degra-
dation is minimised when IDAR is used with the adaptive flexible intrusion
response scheme proposed in this paper. Although IDAR minimises the dam-
age to network performance in all attacks, we observe that in the case of mild
attacks such as rushing or some GH attacks, the adaptive response significantly
reduces the network degradation.
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Figure 13: IRA effectiveness with various attacks in 25 node scenario.
Figure 14: IRA effectiveness with various attacks in 50 node scenario.
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Figure 15: Impact of IRA on AODV overhead with BH, RU and SD attack in 25 node network
4.3.2. Impact of Intrusion Response Action on AODV & IDAR Overhead
Finally, we analyze the packet overhead imposed on the MANETs by the
AODV routing protocol and our protection mechanism. We define the packet
overhead as the number of packets generated multiplied by the number of hops
each packet travels. We consider a 25 node network and analyze the AODV
and IDAR overheads by performing 30 runs (10 runs each with no response
to intrusion, fixed intrusion response, and adaptive intrusion response) with
rushing, BH, and SD attacks.
Fig. 15 shows the impact of IRA on the AODV overhead when a) there is
no response to intrusion, b) fixed response and c) adaptive intrusion response,
in the cases of BH, SD, and rushing attacks. The AODV overhead comprises
all control packets i.e. RREQ, RREP and RERR packets generated in the net-
work during the simulation. The graph shows that as a result of employing the
proposed intrusion response scheme the AODV overhead decreases by 6.8% &
6.4% in the cases of sleep deprivation & rushing attacks respectively. Fig. 16
shows the impact of IRA on the IDAR traffic overhead, including the overhead
of the clustering approach used. This overhead comprises the network charac-
teristic packets reported periodically from CNs to the CHs and the MN, cluster
configuration packets and the AP generated by the MN and CHs to inform CNs
of the required IRA. It can be seen from the graph that the IDAR overhead is
least when there is no response to intrusion, simply because there are no APs
in the network. The overhead is similar when either fixed or adaptive intrusion
response is used; however, using adaptive intrusion response in case of rushing
attack has the least overhead.
Analyzing the two graphs in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 we can see that on average
the AODV traffic is approximately 8 times the IDAR traffic. If we consider all
the network traffic, i.e. AODV, IDAR and the UDP-based CBR traffic that the
network is intended to carry, then the IDAR traffic, including clustering packets,
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Figure 16: Impact of IRA on IDAR overhead on RU, BH and SD attack in 25 node network
contributes on average less than 5% of the total network traffic, a very low sum.
4.4. Comparison
We now compare the proposed IDAR mechanism with two existing tech-
niques, [1] and [13]. In [1], we proposed a generalized intrusion detection and
prevention mechanism, which responds to the detected intrusion by isolating the
intruder in all cases (i.e. fixed response). Fig. 13 shows the degradation in the
network performance with fixed intrusion response of isolation as proposed in
[1], and compares it with IDAR’s adaptive response as proposed in this paper.
The graph indicates that with a fixed intrusion response the network perfor-
mance degrades by an amount in a range from 2% to 12%. However, when
adaptive intrusion response is selected, the NPD is in the range of 3% to 5%.
Table 4 compares the cost sensitive intrusion response model [13] with IDAR.
It can be seen that in [13] the authors proposed the calculation of a Topology
Dependency Index (TDI) and an Attack Damage Index (ADI). The TDI repre-
sents the routing dependency of nodes on the intruder and the ADI represents
the damage caused by an attacker. However, IDAR relies on confidence in
detected attack and its impact on network performance. The model in [13]
operates using five types of intrusion response (normal, recovery, full isolation,
temporary isolation and relocation). IDAR responds to the intrusion by adap-
tively selecting one of the three responses (isolation, route around attacker, and
no punishment). Both the cost sensitive model [13] and IDAR have been imple-
mented using GloMoSim. In general the comparison shows that IDAR is better
in terms of improving network performance in various attacks with minimum
overhead on the network.
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Table 4: Comparison of Cost Sensitive Intrusion Response Model [13] and IDAR.
Comparing Parameter Cost Sensitive Model [13] IDAR
Intrusion response
selection criteria
Topology Dependency Index
(TDI) and Attack Damage
Index (ADI)
Confidence on Attack (COA)
and Network Performance
Degradation (NPD)
Intrusion response actions Normal, Recovery, Full
isolation, Temporary isolation
and Relocation
Isolation, Route around
attacker, and No punishment
Types of attacks
considered
Authenticity, Integrity and
Availability
Black hole, Sleep deprivation,
Rushing, Grey hole
Parameter for intrusion
response impact
assessment
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) Network Performance
Degradation (Eq.5)
Impact of intrusion
response scheme
Max PDR reduction = 13 % Maximum NPD = 7 %
Scalability Simulated up to 50 nodes Simulated up to 200 nodes
Network overhead Not considered Less than 5 % of total network
traffic
5. Conclusion
IDAR can not only detect a number of attacks but can also adaptively re-
spond to the detected attacks to halt the attack and / or mitigate the damage
caused by the attack and prevent further attacks from the intruding nodes. Our
intrusion response scheme has a reduced impact on network performance, and
works by adaptively selecting the intrusion response action based on the level
of confidence in the detection of the attack, the attack severity and the degra-
dation in network performance. The use of a decision table to represent the
intrusion response action selection criteria allows a flexible approach to man-
agement of threats and can accommodate the different security requirements
of the network. IDAR demonstrates the importance of a flexible response that
takes account of network conditions and attack type.
The first part of the case study shows the good performance of IDAR in terms
of its high success and low false alarm rate in a range of attacks. The second
part of the case study results reveal that each of proposed response actions are
appropriate in different attack scenarios. For instance, in severe attacks such
as BH and SD, IDAR can elect to completely isolate the intruding node (81%
and 78% of the time respectively). On the other hand, in mild attacks such as
rushing the mechanism generally opts not to punish the intruding node because
the impact on the network of the attack is low and taking severe action (complete
isolation) could result in an overall degradation in network performance. The
last part of the case study analyzes the impact of proposed IRAs on network
performance, and shows that our mechanism with adaptive flexible intrusion
response is more efficient than either a fixed intrusion response or no response
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in all attack scenarios. We finally note that IDAR incurs a low overhead on the
network, being less than 5% of the overall network traffic.
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